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Note
Charles v. Seigfried: Social Host Liability Takes a
Back Seat to Judicial Restraint
I. INTRODUCTION
Society has long recognized the seriousness of drunk driving.'
State courts commonly acknowledge the social costs associated with
drunk driving accidents.2 Scholars estimate the economic costs of
drunk driving to be over twenty billion dollars a year.3 Tragically,
statistics show that many drunk driving accidents involve intoxicated
minors.4 In addition, statistics show that while licensed taverns occa-
sionally serve minors, it is common for private individuals, known as
social hosts, to serve alcohol to minors during a party or other social
gathering.5 All too often, an intoxicated minor leaves the social host's
home and subsequently causes an automobile accident.6
I. See generally Sharon E. Conaway, Comment, The Continuing Search for Solutions
to the Drinking Driver Tragedy and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 Nw. U. L.
REV. 403, 403 (1988) (noting that alcohol related traffic accidents are a leading cause of
death in the United States); Larry Kraft, The Drive to Stop the Drinker from Driving:
Suggested Civil Approaches, 59 N.D. L. REV. 391, 392 (1983) (noting the great pres-
sure on state legislatures to promulgate more stringent drunk driving laws); Carla K.
Smith, Note, Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused by the Acts of An Intoxicated
Guest, 59 N.D. L. REV. 445, 445 (1983) (illustrating the high rate of fatal car accidents
that involve alcohol); Derry D. Sparlin, Jr., Note, Social Host Liability for Guests Who
Drink and Drive: A Closer Look at the Benefits and Burdens, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
583, 584 (1986) (noting the increased pressure on state courts and legislatures to deal
with the drunk driving problem).
2. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 866 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.8 (Ariz.
1994) (citing the alarming statistics of underage drunk driving); Bankston v. Brennan,
507 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1987) (recognizing the "misery caused by drunken drivers
and the losses sustained by both individuals and society at the hands of drunken drivers")
(quoting Homes v. Circo, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (Neb. 1976)); Cravens v. Inman, 586
N.E.2d 367, 377 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1991) (citing the social devastation from social
hosts who serve alcohol to minors), overruled on other grounds by Charles v. Seigfried,
651 N.E.2d 154 (I11. 1995); Puckett v. Mr. Lucky's Ltd., 529 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (I11.
App. 4th Dist. 1988) (Knecht, J., dissenting) (recognizing the health threat to Illinois
citizens from alcohol).
3. Conaway, supra note I, at 403.
4. See Smith, supra note 1, at 447. See also Bonita Brodt, $1 Million Award in
Liquor Death, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 1995, § 2, at 8 (citing the tragedy of drunk driving ac-
cidents that take the lives of teenagers).
5. Smith, supra note I, at 447.
6. Id. at 471; see also infra part II.E (discussing the Illinois district split on social
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Recognizing these unfortunate consequences, legislatures and courts
alike have attempted to resolve the problem of underage drinking.7
Some state legislatures raised the legal drinking age;8 some went fur-
ther by strengthening the criminal penalties for serving alcohol to
young people. 9 Additionally, a number of state legislatures imposed
statutory duties on social hosts who serve alcohol to minors.'" More-
over, since the early 1970s, some state courts imposed liability upon
social hosts whose intoxicated minor guests cause injuries."
The Illinois Supreme Court recently rejected attempts to adopt civil
liability for social hosts who serve minors alcohol. 12 Historically, Illi-
nois courts have denied any attempt to impose liability on social
hosts.' 3 The long line of precedent in Illinois, however, came to an
abrupt end in 1991, when the appellate court in the State's first district
held that social hosts could be liable for injuries caused by minor
guests." Subsequently, two other appellate courts held that social
hosts could be liable, thereby creating a district split and making social
host liability the majority rule in Illinois. 5 Resolving this district split,
host liability).
7. See infra parts IL.B-E.
8. Conaway, supra note i, at 404. See also Michael P. Rosenthal, The Minimum
Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 654 (1988)
(citing the huge increases in auto fatalities among young people as the reason for rais-
ing the drinking age to 21). In 1984, a new federal law withheld a certain percentage of
state highway funds to states that did not have a minimum drinking age of 21. 23 U.S.C.
§ 158 (1994).
9. For example, in 1994, the Illinois General Assembly raised the offense of serving
alcohol to a minor from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class A misdemeanor. Pub. Act No.
88-613, 1994 II!. Laws 1339 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16(b)
(West Supp. 1996)).
10. See infra part Il.D.
11. See, e.g., Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d
18, 23 (Or. 1971) (imposing social host liability based on a general negligence theory).
See infra part II.C.
1 2. Charles v. Seigfried, 651 N.E.2d 154, 159 (II. 1995) [hereinafter Charles Il].
13. See infra part lI.B.
14. Cravens v. Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367, 377 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1991), overruled by
Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d 154 (Iii. 1995).
15. Bzdek v. Townsley, 634 N.E.2d 389, 395 (Il1. App. 2d Dist. 1994), rev'd sub
nom. Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d 154 (II1. 1995); Charles v. Seigfried, 623 N.E.2d 1021,
1024 (I11. App. 3d Dist. 1993) [hereinafter Charles 11, rev'd, 651 N.E.2d 154 (I11. 1995).
After the Bzdek decision in 1994, three out of Illinois' five appellate districts, the first,
second, and third districts, imposed social host liability. See, e.g., Bzdek, 634 N.E.2d
at 395 (2d Dist.); Charles 1, 623 N.E.2d at 1024 (3d Dist.); Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 377
(1st Dist.). Illinois' fourth and fifth districts rejected social host liability. See, e.g.,
Holtz v. Amax Zinc Co., 519 N.E.2d 54, 58 (I11. App. 5th Dist. 1988); Miller v. Moran,
421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Il1. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
Charles v. Seigfried
the Illinois Supreme Court, in Charles v. Seigfried, ' 6 rejected the ap-
pellate court's approach and reinstated the traditional rule against social
host liability for minor guests who cause injuries.'"
This Note critically analyzes the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
in Charles. First, this Note reviews the history of social host liability
in Illinois and other states, focusing primarily on the Illinois courts'
interpretations of the Illinois Dramshop Act.' This Note then exam-
ines the decisions that created the district split in Illinois.' 9 Next, this
Note discusses the facts and opinions of the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Charles v. Seigfried.20 This Note then critically analyzes
the opinion of the supreme court, considering the court's application of
stare decisis, its deference to the General Assembly, and the scope of
the decision. 2' This Note then predicts that the General Assembly will
acquiesce in the court's decision.22 Finally, this Note concludes that
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision correctly reinstates the traditional
rule against social host liability.
23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of Alcohol Related Liability: The Common Law and
the Illinois Dramshop Act
At common law, a cause of action did not exist against any person
who furnished alcohol to any other person. 24 Courts commonly rec-
ognized that "a strong and able bodied man" must be responsible for
his own actions, even if those actions included intoxication and, sub-
sequently, injuries to third parties. 25 Courts simply reasoned that the
16. 651 N.E.2d 154 (111. 1995).
17. Id. at 159.
18. See infra parts II.A.-D.
19. See infra part II.E.
20. See infra part 111.
21. See infra part IV.
22. See infra part V.
23. See infra part VI.
24. See, e.g., Comment, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: Recent Developments and
Alternative Solutions, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 775, 778 (1957) [hereinafter Illinois Dram
Shop Act]; Mark D. Roth, Comment, Social Host Liability in Illinois: Right Without a
Remedy, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 735 (1986); Smith, supra note 1, at 446.
25. Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (111. 1889). See also Joyce v. Hatfied, 78 A.2d 754,
756 (Md. 1951). In Joyce, Maryland's highest court declared:
Apart from statute, the common law knows no right of action against a seller
of intoxicating liquors, as such, for "causing" intoxication of the person
whose negligent or wilful wrong has caused injury. Human beings, drunk or
sober, are responsible for their own torts. The law (apart from statute)
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proximate cause of alcohol-related injuries was not the furnishing of
the alcohol, but, rather, the consumption of it.26 Accordingly, courts
did not recognize any cause of action against those who served alco-
hol. 2
7
Historically, Illinois adhered to this rule against the liability of those
who served alcohol. 28 In 1872, however, the Illinois General As-
sembly modified the common law doctrine, enacting a civil remedy
against commercial sellers of alcohol.29 Specifically, the 'Dramshop
Act, 30 established a cause of action against people who, "by selling or
giving intoxicating liquors," caused the intoxication of another person,
who consequently injured a third party.3' The Dramshop Act reflected
the temperance movement of the time.32 The Act, which was enacted
to combat the evils that resulted from alcohol, promoted this temper-
ance movement by aiming to "suppress the mischief of intoxication. 33
The Illinois Supreme Court first held that the Dramshop Act did not
apply to social hosts in Cruse v. Aden. 34 In Cruse, the plaintiffs hus-
band was tossed off his horse after having drinks at Aden's home.35
The plaintiff claimed that Aden was liable under common law negli-
recognizes no relation of proximate cause between a sale of liquor aad a tort
committed by a buyer who has drunk the liquor.
Id. at 756.
26. Smith, supra note 1, at 446.
27. Id.
28. See Cruse, 20 N.E. at 74.
29. 1871 Ill. Laws 552-54. See also Illinois Dram Shop Act, supra note 24, at 775-
77 (discussing the operation of the Dramshop Act, which imposes liability on commer-
cial sellers of alcohol).
30. The section of the Act which established this liability became known as the
"Dramshop Act." See Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 157.
3 1. 1871 Ill. Laws 553-54. The entire Act comprised 10 sections, of which only one,
§ 5, created a private cause of action. Id. The relevant portion of § 5 of the original
Dramshop Act read:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person, who
shall be injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated
person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any
person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or
jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving
intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such
person or persons ....
Id.
32. Charles I, 651 N.E.2d at 154, 157.
33. Illinois Dram Shop Act, supra note 24, at 778 (quoting Hyba v. C.A. Homeman,
Inc., 23 N.E.2d 564, 565 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1939)).
34. 20 N.E. 73, 77 (Ill. 1889).
35. Id. at 73.
Charles v. Seigfried
gence and the new Dramshop Act.36 The court, however, quickly
dismissed the plaintiff's common law negligence claim, declaring that
it was not a tort at common law to serve alcohol to another person.37
The court recognized that a "strong and able bodied man" had the re-
sponsibility to make his own choices.38
The court also held that the Dramshop Act applied only to those in
the liquor business.39 The court, considering the title of the Dramshop
Act, determined that the Act focused only on the commercial selling of
liquor.4 Moreover, the court, after considering the Act as a whole,
found that the legislature must have intended the Act to apply only to
dramshops-licensed sellers of alcohol.4' The court reasoned that the
Act was penal in nature and therefore had to be construed strictly in
order to avoid extending liability beyond the intent of the legislature.42
36. Id. at 74.
3 7. Id. The Cruse court declared:
It was not a tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to "a
strong and able bodied man," and it can be said safely that it is not anywhere
laid down in the books that such act was even held at common law to be
culpable negligence that would impose legal liability for damages upon the
vendor or donor of such liquor.
Id.
38. See id. at 75.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Cruse court reasoned:
The matters contained in ... the provisions in respect to gifts of intoxicating
liquor, if limited to those who are in some way connected with the sale of
intoxicating liquor, legitimately appertain and are germane to the subject
expressed in the title of the act, but in respect to mere gifts of liquor by
persons not connected directly or indirectly with the liquor traffic, or with any
sale of liquor, it cannot be fairly said such gifts by them are embraced or
expressed in such title.
Id. The title of the original act read: "AN ACT to provide against the evils resulting from
the sale of intoxicating liquors in the state of Illinois." 1871 Ill. Laws 552.
4 1. Cruse, 20 N.E. at 75-76. The court held:
It is but reasonable to presume, since there is nothing in the context to rebut
such presumption, and it is in conformity with the title and general scope of
the act, that the legislature, in using these words "give" and "giving" in these
three sections of the same act, intended they should have one and the same
meaning. Since the expression, "the giving away of intoxicating liquors,"
found in section 13 [of the Act] has reference only to those who are engaged or
participate in the liquor traffic . . . we may conclude . . . the expression
"against any person or persons who shall by selling or giving intoxicating
liquors," found in section 9, have a like restricted sense and signification
[sic].
Id. at 76.
42. Id. at 77.
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B. Modem Interpretations of the Dramshop Act
Under the Liquor Control Act
After the decision in Cruse, which held that the Dramshop Act ap-
plied only to sellers of alcohol, the Illinois Supreme Court decided the
landmark case of Cunningham v. Brown.43 In Cunningham, the court
considered the Dramshop Act as it appeared under Illinois' newly en-
acted liquor statute, known as the Liquor Control Act of 1934. 44 The
plaintiff, whose husband committed suicide from alcohol-induced de-
spondency, commenced an action against the defendant tavern. 45 Be-
cause the defendant was a tavern, the plaintiff's first claim came under
the Dramshop Act.46 In an effort to increase her pecuniary recovery,
the plaintiff also claimed that the defendant had served her husband in
violation of the Liquor Control Act and, therefore, was civilly liable to
the plaintiff.47 Finally, the plaintiff argued that the defendant should
be liable under common law negligence.4
The court rejected the plaintiffs claim based on a violation of the
Liquor Control Act, holding that only the Dramshop Act created a civil
remedy under the Liquor Control Act.49 Interpreting the original Act
43. 174 N.E.2d 153 (111. 1961).
44. Id. at 154. In 1934, the Illinois General Assembly adopted a new regulatory
scheme for alcohol, known as the Liquor Control Act, which is still the current law.
1933-34 Ill. Laws 57 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch 235, §§ 5/1-11 (West 1992)
(amended 1995)). The current law comprises much of the original act of 1872, including
the remedy established in § 5 and interpreted by the Cruse court. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 235, § 5/6-21 (West 1992). The act also includes various criminal penalties for
those that serve alcohol to minors and certain other people. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch.
235, § 5/6-16 (West 1992) (amended by Pub. Act No. 89-250, § 5, 1995 Ill. Legis. Serv.
3009-10 (West)).
45. Cunningham, 174 N.E.2d at 154.
46. Id. at 155. At the time of Cunningham, the recovery under the Dramshop Act was
limited to $15,000. Id.
47. Id. Under Illinois law, a person can be civilly liable for injuries caused during the
violation of a criminal statute. First Nat'l Bank v. City of Aurora, 373 N.E.2d 1326,
1330 (111. 1978). In First Nat'l Bank, the Illinois Supreme Court held "that the party in-
jured thereby has a cause of action, provided he comes within the purview of the particu-
lar ordinance or statute, and the injury has a direct and proximate connection with the
violation." Id. (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 886 (111. 1960)). See also W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 224-27 (5th ed.
1984) (noting that a violation of statute creates a civil cause of action when the statute
protects the class of the plaintiff and prevents the specific harm suffered by the plain-
tiff).
48. Cunningham, 174 N.E.2d at 154. Under Illinois law, a defendant can be liable for
negligence if the defendant failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care to the plaintiff
and the lack of reasonable care proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. Cravens v.
Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367, 378 (I11. App. Ist. Dist. 1991), overruled on other grounds by
Charles IH, 651 N.E.2d at 156.
49. Cunningham, 174 N.E.2d at 156. The trial court, though dismissing the plain-
1072 [Vol. 27
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of 1872, the Cunningham court determined that the General Assembly
had intended to create only one remedy as embodied in the Dramshop
Act. 50 The General Assembly, the Cunningham court concluded,
never intended the Dramshop Act to complement a latent remedy
against social hosts.5 The court reasoned that the General Assembly's
choice to enact the original Dramshop Act illustrated that the common
law never included a cause of action against a person who served alco-
hol.52 The Cunningham court concluded that the original Dramshop
Act remained the only remedy in the modern Liquor Control Act.
53
Thus, because the remedy was exclusive, the plaintiff could not re-
cover under any other section of the Liquor Control Act,54 and the de-
fendant could not be civilly liable for the statutory violation of the
Liquor Control Act.
55
In addition to determining the exclusiveness of the remedies avail-
able under the Dramshop Act, the Cunningham court also denied the
plaintiffs claim under common law negligence.56 The court reasoned
that the General Assembly had intended to create a remedy against the
servers of alcohol because such a remedy did not exist at common
law.57 The court concluded that the General Assembly enacted the
tiff's common law claim and violation of statute claim, did not dismiss the plaintiff's
claim under the Dramshop Act. Id. at 154.
50. Id. at 155-56. After considering the history of the Illinois temperance move-
ment, the court declared:
A reading of the act of 1872 also leads to the conclusion that section 5 was not
intended to provide a remedy in addition to a civil remedy for the violation of
section 2. These two sections together with eight other sections of the act
were all enacted at the same time. The legislature in sections 6, 8 and 9
carefully laid out the procedure to be followed and the court in which an action
should be brought for the violation of section 2 or for an action arising under
section 5. A civil remedy was not left to inference but was carefully spelled
out in section 5.
Id. at 156. The court then concluded that the civil remedy under the Liquor Control Act
"provides the only civil remedy under our present act." Id.
51. Id. at 157.
52. Id. at 156.
53. Id. at 157. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
54. Cunningham, 174 N.E.2d at 157.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 157.
57. Id. at 156. The court stated:
We would be delving in judicial metaphysics if we were to say that the
legislature intended to provide a remedy in addition to a common law remedy
which existed but had not as yet been declared by the courts. Legislative
intent must be ascertained through examination of the practical considerations
to which the legislature directed itself when enacting section 5 of the original
statute. . . . The inescapable conclusion is that the legislature did not intend
the act to be complementary to a common-law right it knew nothing about,
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only available remedy against those who serve alcohol, thereby pre-
empting alcohol related common law liability in Illinois.5" Accord-
ingly, the court refused to adopt a common law remedy against those
who furnish alcohol.59
For many years, Illinois courts consistently followed the interpreta-
tion of the Dramshop Act established in Cunningham.6 For example,
the Illinois Supreme Court, in Demchuk v. Duplancich,6' held that a
plaintiff could recover against a seller of alcohol only under the
Dramshop Act.62 In Demchuk, the plaintiff commenced an action
against a tavern owner, but he was unable to recover under the
Dramshop Act because the statute of limitations had expired.63 At-
tempting to find a different cause of action, the plaintiff argued that the
commercial seller should be civilly liable because the seller violated the
Liquor Control Act's prohibition on serving alcohol to minors.64 The
court rejected this effort to recover, holding that the Dramshop Act was
the exclusive remedy under the Liquor Control Act.65
Illinois courts also consistently adhered to the preemptory effect of
tl& Dramshop Act over any common law claims.66 For instance, in
but, on the contrary, intended to create a remedy in an area where it believed
none existed.
Id.
58. Id. The Cunningham court established that the lack of a common law remedy
against those who furnish alcohol "motivated our legislature ... to create such liabil-
ity." Id. at 157. The legislature, however, created such liability only against commer-
cial sellers of alcohol. Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 160 (111. 1961); Estate of Ritchie v.
Farrell, 572 N.E.2d 367, 369 (111. App. 3d Dist. 1991). In Estate of Ritchie, the court
stated: "The sole remedy available to a plaintiff seeking damages resulting from intoxi-
cation is provided by the Dramshop Act, under which the uncompensated social host is
clearly not liable." Id. at 369.
61. 440 N.E.2d 112 (Ill. 1982).
62. Id. at 114.
63. Id. at 113-16. The court declared that "the special one year limitation in the
Dramshop Act is a condition precedent to the right of recovery which must be observed
by all plaintiffs in order to bring themselves within the Act." Id. at 116.
64. Id.
65. Id. Following the reasoning of Cunningham, the court stated: "The lack of a
common law remedy motivated our legislature ... to create such liability. Hence, the li-
ability imposed, which does not depend upon fault or negligence, and the damages re-
coverable are expressly and exclusively defined in the Act." Id. at 114 (citations omit-
ted). As a consequence of the court's decision, the plaintiff was without any remedy for
his injuries. Id. at 117.
66. See, e.g., Estate of Ritchie v. Farrell, 572 N.E.2d 367, 369 (111. App. 3d Dist.
1991); Puckett v. Mr. Lucky's Ltd., 529 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (111. App. 4th Dist. 1988);
Zamiar v. Linderman, 478 N.E.2d 534, 535 (111. App. Ist Dist. 1985); Lowe v. Rubin,
424 N.E.2d 710, 711-12 (i11. App. 1st Dist. 1981); Miller v. Moran, 421 N.E.2d 1046,
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Coulter v. Swearingen,67 an appellate court held that social hosts could
not be liable under common law negligence for the injuries caused by
an intoxicated minor.68 Rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the
Dramshop Act should not preempt common law based alcohol-related
liability in Illinois, the Coulter court explicitly followed the doctrine
established in Cunningham.6 9 The court concluded that only the legis-
lature could change the rule against social host liability.70
C. Social Host Liability in the Courts of Other States
Similar to the courts in Illinois, many other state courts have refused
to create a remedy against social hosts whose minor guests have
caused injury.71 In Bankston v. Brennan,72 for example, the Florida
Supreme Court refused to create such a common law cause of action.73
The plaintiff, claiming that the social host had violated the State's
liquor act, argued that the social host was liable.74 Rejecting the plain-
tiff's claim, the court noted that the state legislature had limited liability
for alcohol-related injuries only to vendors. Moreover, the court
recognized that the legislature had actively entered the field of alcohol-
1048-49 (111. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
67. 447 N.E.2d 561 (111. App. 3d Dist. 1983).
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id. at 563.
70. Id. at 564. Holding that the Dramshop Act preempted alcohol-related remedies
and that the judiciary should not change the law, the Coulter court affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs common law claim for a failure to state a cause of ac-
tion. Id. at 562-64. The court emphasized the importance of the Cunningham decision.
Id. at 563. The court noted that it had "directed considerable attention to Cunningham
for the reason that it is a landmark case pertaining to the Dram Shop Act and that it
clearly establishes that it (the Act) has preempted the field of liability relating to alco-
hol." Id.
Illinois courts have often held that any change in social host liability in Illinois must
come from the legislature. See, e.g., Estate of Ritchie, 572 N.E.2d at 369-70; Puckett,
529 N.E.2d at 1170; Zamiar, 478 N.E.2d at 536; Lowe, 424 N.E.2d at 714; Miller, 412
N.E.2d at 1049.
71. See, e.g., Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)(refusing to recognize a cause of action against social hosts under the violation of
statute); Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 920-22 (Tex. 1993) (refusing to extend com-
mon law negligence principles to social host liability); Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc.,
350 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Va. 1986) (allowing a remedy under the common law or the vi-
olation of the state's liquor control act).
72. 507 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1987).
73. Id. at 1387.
74. Id. at 1386. In Bankston, the plaintiff argued that the defendant social host had
served alcohol to a minor, thereby violating section 768.125 of the Florida code. Id.(citing FLA. STAT. ch. 768.125 (1987) (which allows vendors to be held liable for injury
or damages resulting from their selling or furnishing alcohol to minors)).
75. Id. at 1386-87.
1076 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
related liability and had never imposed social host liability. 6 The court
held that the legislature had the sole responsibility for enacting social
host liability."
Unlike the court in Bankston, some state courts have determined
that the violation of a liquor act permits a plaintiff to recover against a
social host.78 For example, in Hansen v. Friend,79 the Washington
Supreme Court held that a social host who served a minor in violation
of a liquor statute could be held civilly liable for injuries sustained by
the minor.80 First, the court acknowledged that the Washington judi-
ciary could adopt a statute as a measure of a reasonable person's con-
duct.8 ' The court then determined that the legislature enacted the liquor
statute to protect the interests of minors, and prevent injuries caused by
intoxicated minors.82 Because the social host should have foreseen the
injuries caused by the intoxicated minor, the court reasoned, the de-
fendant could be civilly liable for violating the liquor statute. 3
76. Id. at 1387. The court did not deny that it had the power to create social host lia-
bility, but held that "when the legislature has actively entered a particular field and has
clearly indicated its ability to deal with such a policy question, the more prudent course
is for this court to defer to the legislative branch." Id.
77. Id. The court explained that "of the three branches of government, the judiciary is
the least capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy questions."
Id. at 1387 (citing Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So.2d 644,
646 (Fla. 1986)). The Bankston court's deference to the state legislature represents the
reasoning used by many courts in their refusal to adopt social host liability. See, e.g.,
Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Williamson v. Old
Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Va. 1986).
78. See, e.g., Brattain v. Herron, 309 N.E.2d 150, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974);
Longstreth v. Gensel, 377 N.W.2d 804, 812-13 (Mich. 1985); Walker v. Key, 686 P.2d
973, 977-78 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Mitseff v. Wheeler, 526 N.E.2d 798, 800 (Ohio
1988); Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515, 517-18 (Pa. 1983); Koback v.
Crook, 366 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Wis. 1985).
79. 824 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1992). In Hansen, the social host violated § 66.44.270(1)
of the Washington code, which makes it a crime to serve alcohol to a minor. Id. (citing
WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.270(1) (1992)).
80. Id. at 488.
8 1. Id. at 485. If the judiciary chose to adopt a statute as the reasonable degree of
conduct, then a violation of such a statute constitutes negligence. The court noted that
Washington courts use the test set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts when
deciding whether to adopt the requirements of a particular legislative enactment as a
standard of conduct for reasonable persons. Id. The test sets out that the legislative re-
quirements may be adopted when the purpose of the enactment is the following:
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
Id. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965)).
82. Id. at 485-86.
83. Id. at 487. The court noted that "the concept of forseeability determines the
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Accordingly, the court held that a jury could find the social hosts
civilly liable for the minor's injuries.8 4
Other state courts that have created social host liability have not ref-
erenced any statute, and have simply held that a social host whose mi-
nor guests caused injuries may be civilly liable under common law
negligence. 5 In Hart v. Ivey,8 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court
imposed civil liability on a social host because the social host did not
exercise a reasonable degree of care.87 The court determined that the
defendant had knowingly served alcohol to an intoxicated minor, and
had permitted the minor to drive home. 8 The court held that a person
of "ordinary prudence" could reasonably foresee that an intoxicated
minor was likely to cause an accident.89 Recognizing that a jury could
find that the furnishing of alcohol proximately caused the accident,9 °
the court held that the defendant was liable under common law negli-
gence despite the absence of a violation of any statute.9'
D. Legislative Policies
While the courts in many states have created social host liability, a
number of state legislatures have also enacted statutory duties for so-
cial hosts.92 The Colorado legislature, for instance, modified the tra-
ditional common law principle that the consumption of alcohol, rather
than the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause for all alcohol-related
scope of the duty owed," and that the question of whether the defendant's injuries were
forseeable is for the trier of fact to decide. Id.
84. Id. at 488.
85. See, e.g., Ely v. Murphy, 540 A.2d 54, 58 (Conn. 1988); DiOssi v. Maroney,
548 A.2d 1361, 1368 (Del. 1988); Batten v. Bobo, 528 A.2d 572, 574 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1986); Lopez v. Maez, 651 P.2d 1269, 1276 (N.M. 1982); Weiner v. Gamma
Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18, 21-22 (Or. 1971) (modified by
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.950 (1990)).
86. 420 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1992). North Carolina's highest court explicitly declared
that the state's dramshop act "does not abrogate any claims for relief under the common
law." Id. at 178.
87. Id. at 177-78. In North Carolina, people are liable under common law negligence
if they fail to exercise "that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person would
exercise under similar conditions. A defendant is liable for his negligence if the negli-
gence is the proximate cause of injury to a person to whom the defendant is under a duty
to use reasonable care." Id.
88. Id. at 178.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 23-808 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 2506
(West 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-6-305 (1995).
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injuries.93 The Colorado legislature enacted a civil remedy against so-
cial hosts when a social host "willfully and knowingly" serves alcohol
to any minor.94 Although the Colorado courts have narrowly con-
strued this statute, the civil remedy nevertheless evinces a clear intent
of the legislature to create a remedy against social hosts who serve mi-
nors.
95
Unlike the Colorado legislature, the California legislature explicitly
abrogated a decision that permitted a plaintiff to recover against a social
host. In the 1978 case of Coulter v. Superior Court,97 the California
Supreme Court held that a social host could be civilly liable for injuries
caused by either a minor or adult guest.98 The court interpreted the
State's Dramshop Act to impose liability on commercial vendors and
social hosts alike. 99 The California legislature immediately responded,
explicitly overruling the Coulter decision.'00 The legislature's
amended statute recognized that a person's consumption of alcohol,
rather than the serving of alcohol, is the proximate cause of any in-
juries the intoxicated person causes.'
93. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-128.5 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995). See also
Chariton v. Kimata, 815 P.2d 946, 948-49 (Colo. 1991) (interpreting the statute to
modify the traditional common law principle for the furnishing of alcohol).
94. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-128.5. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40(b)
(Supp. 1995) (permitting recovery against a social host when the host "willfully and
knowingly" serves alcohol to a minor.who will drive intoxicated).
95. Forrest v. Lorrigan, 833 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). In Forrest, a
Colorado appellate court determined that a social host was not liable under § 12-47-
128.5, despite the social host's knowledge that intoxicated minors were consuming
alcohol in her home. Id. The court held that the requisite willfulness and knowledge
only exist when the "social host has control over or takes an active part in supplying a
minor with alcohol." Id. at 875.
96. Stats. 1978, c. 929, p. 2903, § I (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602
(West 1985 & Supp. 1996)).
97. 577 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1978).
98. Id. at 673.
99. Id.
100. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602(c). The California statute states:
The legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the
holdings in cases such as ... Coulter v. Superior Court ... be abrogated in
favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic
beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate
cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
Id.
101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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E. The Illinois District Split
The Illinois General Assembly has consistently refused to enact so-
cial host liability. 0 2 As recently as 1994, the Illinois General As-
sembly proposed a bill that included a remedy against social hosts
whose intoxicated minor guests cause injuries. °3 Although much of
the bill passed both houses, the portion that imposed social host liabil-
ity died in committee.'04 Attempts to reinsert the social host portion
also failed.0 5 Though the General Assembly did enact a remedy
against those who rent motel rooms for the unlawful consumption of
alcohol by minors, the General Assembly has denied any effort to en-
act a general remedy against social hosts."°
Similarly, the Fourth and Fifth Illinois Appellate Districts rejected
social host liability. The Fourth Appellate District, in Miller v.
Moran, 10 7 held that the Dramshop Act preempted any common law
claims.)° In addition, the Fifth Appellate District, in Holtz v. Amax
Zinc Co.,'o9 also rejected a common law cause of action against a non-
commercial supplier of alcohol. " 0
Although the Illinois General Assembly had failed to enact social
host liability, and two Illinois appellate courts had recently rejected the
argument, an Illinois appellate court created such liability in 1991. '"
Radically departing from traditional Illinois principles, the First Appel-
102. See, e.g., H.B. 3095, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1994); S.B. 1328, 88th Gen.
Assem., 2d Sess. (1994); H.B. 2815, 87th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1992) (died in com-
mittee on January 12, 1993); H.B. 319, 86th Gen. Assem., Ist Sess. (1989) (tabled in
committee in May, 1990); H.B. 2707, 85th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1988) (tabled in
committee on May 8, 1987); H.B. 738, 84th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1986) (died in
committee on January 13, 1987).
103. S.B. 1328, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1994).
104. S.B. 1328, Senate Amendment No. I, 88th Gen. Assem., 2d Sess. (1994).
105. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d 154, 162-63 (I11. 1995). Six bills introduced into the
General Assembly that would have created a cause of action against social hosts were all
blocked in either the House or the Senate. Id. See supra notes 102-04 and accompany-
ing text.
106. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. The
General Assembly enacted a civil remedy for any person injured by a minor that con-
sumed alcohol at a motel rented for the express purpose of the unlawful consumption of
alcohol by that minor. Pub. Act No. 84-1380, 1986 I11. Laws 3139 (codified at ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-21(a) (West 1992)).
107. 421 N.E.2d 1046 (III. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
108. Id. at 1049.
109. 519 N.E.2d 54 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1988).
110. Id. at 57-58.
111. See infra notes 112-40 and accompanying text.
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late District in Cravens v. Inman"2 held that social hosts could be li-
able for the injuries caused by their intoxicated minor guests." 3 In
Cravens, Joleen Cravens died in a car accident when an intoxicated
minor lost control of the vehicle in which Joleen was a passenger '
14
The plaintiff, Joleen's father, claimed that the social host was civilly li-
able because the defendant violated the Liquor Control Act and the Illi-
nois Premises Liability Act."'
Before addressing the plaintiff's two substantive claims, the
Cravens court dismissed many of the traditional arguments against im-
posing social host liability." 6 First, the court determined that the
Dramshop Act does not explicitly preempt the common law develop-
ment of social host liability. "7 Furthermore, the court declared that the
reasoning employed in Cunningham did not address social host liabil-
ity." 8 Rather, the court concluded, because the Liquor Control Act
did not include any social host liability provision, the legislature cer-
tainly did not originally intend to preempt any latent common law rem-
edy against social hosts." 9
After rejecting the preemption argument, the Cravens court modified
the traditional common law rule against social host liability.' 20 Refus-
ing to accept the defendant's claim that the legislature is more properly
positioned to change the rule, the court noted the judiciary's respon-
sibility under the common law.' 2' The court observed that common
112. 586 N.E.2d 367, 380 (II. App. 1st Dist. 1991), overruled by Charles II, 651
N.E.2d at 154, 159, 164.
113. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 380.
114. Id. at 369.
115. Id. at 370. The plaintiff argued that the defendant social host violated § 6-16(c)
of the Liquor Control Act, which makes it a crime to serve alcohol to minors. Id. at 371
(citing ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16 (West 1992)). See infra note 131. See
also supra note 47 (discussing civil liability for the violation of a statute).
The plaintiff also claimed that the social host violated the Premises Liability Act,
which creates a statutory duty for all property owners to exercise reasonable care
"'regarding the state of the premises or acts done or omitted on them."' Id. at 378 (citing
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 130/1 (West 1992), amended by Pub. Act No. 89-007,
1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 35 (West) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 130/2
(West Supp. 1996)) (reducing the duties required of a property owner).
1 16. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 375-77.
117. Id. at 375.
118. Id. The court dismissed the preemption argument made in Cunningham. Id. The
court declared that the "Dram Shop Act and the Liquor Control Act contain no provision
regarding social host liability. As a result, we cannot say that these statutes disclose a
legislative intent to create or abrogate a common law remedy for the facts presented
herein." Id.
119. Id. at 375-76. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 376-78.
121. Id. at 376. The Cravens court, bolstering its position on the role of the
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law is of judicial origin and must be adjusted to reflect the changing
needs of society. 22 Consequently, the Cravens court changed the
long-standing Illinois rule that the consumption of alcohol was the
only proximate cause of any injury caused by an intoxicated person. 21
The court reasoned that a minor, unlike "an able bodied man," could
not responsibly consume alcohol. 24 Accordingly, it held that a person
who furnished alcohol to a minor could proximately cause injuries re-
sulting from the actions the intoxicated minor.'25
The court also dismissed the defendant's claim that stare decisis'
26
should prevent the court from departing from precedent. 27 Although
the Cravens court demonstrated respect for that legal doctrine, the
court nevertheless noted that stare decisis does not make the law static;
rather, stare decisis has never completely prohibited the development
of common law principles. 28 Moreover, the court declared that the
judiciary, noted:
We find no wisdom in abdicating to the legislature our essential function of
reevaluating our common law concepts in the light of present day realities.
Nor do we find judicial sagacity in continually looking backward and parroting
the words and analyses of other courts so as to embalm for posterity the legal
concepts of the past.
Id. at 377 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (Ii. 1960)).
122. Id. at 376.
123. Id. at 375-76. The court stated that "the injustice of the present jurisprudence
places upon this court the imperative duty to rectify that injustice through reevaluation
of our current legal precedent." Id. at 376. Recognizing the ability of the judiciary to
develop the common law, the Cravens court noted that many other state courts have judi-
cially imposed social host liability. Id. at 374. The court called this the "prevailing
view." Id. at 379. The court, arguing that few courts have deferred to their legislatures
on this issue, listed many of these judicial decisions. Id. at 374-75. The court further de-
termined that the legislature and the judiciary should "exercise a shared responsibility to
cooperatively develop the common law in response to the changing needs of our soci-
ety." Id. at 376.
124. Id. at 377.
125. Id. at 378. The court recognized that this change in the common law reflects the
contemporary ideas about youth and alcohol. Id.
126. Stare decisis is the judicial policy to stand by precedents and not disturb that
which is settled. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (5th ed. 1979).
127. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 377. Illinois courts have often noted that the consis-
tency in the law created an obstacle to imposing social host liability. See generally
Estate of Ritchie v. Farrell, 572 N.E.2d 367, 369 (III. App. 3d Dist. 1991) (citing Olsen
v. Copeland, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Wis. 1979) (claiming that any change in the law
will deeply affect social and business relationships)); Puckett v. Mr. Lucky's Ltd., 529
N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (I11. App. 4th Dist. 1988) (recognizing that any change in the law
could create social and economic havoc).
128. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 376-77. While the court conceded that stare decisis is
based on long standing principles, the court did note:
[lit is equally well established that stare decisis is not so static that it deprives
the court of all power to develop the law. Moreover, the maintenance of
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judiciary has an obligation to change precedent that is not consonant
with the current needs of society. 29 The Cravens court added that the
importance of its decision outweighed the chaos that might result from
a district split in Illinois.130
After dismissing the traditional obstacles against imposing social
host liability, the Cravens court addressed the merits of the plaintiff's
claim based on section 6-16 of the Liquor Control Act, which forbids
persons from giving or selling alcohol to minors.13' The court held
that the plaintiff fell within the purview of the statute, as the legislature
intended the section to protect minors from the dangers of alcohol, and
to prevent tragic automobile accidents that involve intoxicated mi-
nors. 32 The court then held that the defendant knew or should have
stability in our legal concepts does not and should not occupy a preeminent
position over the judiciary's obligation to reconsider legal rules that have
become inequitable in light of the changing needs of our society.
Id. at 377 (citations omitted).
129. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
130. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 377. The court held:
In our view, the concerns suggested by defendant are greatly outweighed by the
economic and social devastation on society that occurs when social hosts, as
alleged in the instant cause, knowingly permit minor guests at a social
gathering to consume alcohol to the point of inebriation, and allow the minor
guests to depart from the gathering by driving a motor vehicle while
intoxicated.
Id.
131. Id. at 378-79. The plaintiff brought his claim under §§ 6-16(a) and (c). ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16 (West 1992), amended by Pub. Act No. 89-250, § 5,
1995 Ill. Legis. Serv. 3009 (West). The relevant portion of subsection (a) reads:
No person, after purchasing or otherwise obtaining alcoholic liquor, shall
sell, give or deliver such alcoholic liquor to another person under the age of 21
years, except in the performance of a religious ceremony or service. Any
person who violates the provisions of this paragraph of this subsection (a) is
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and the person's sentence shall include, but
shall not be limited to, a fine of not less than $500.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16(a). The other relevant portion of subsection (c)
reads:
Any person shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor where he or she
knowingly permits a gathering at a residence which he or she occupies of two
or more persons where any one or more of the persons is under 21 years of age
and the following factors also apply:
(1) the person occupying the residence knows that any such person under the
age of 21 is in possession of or is consuming any alcoholic beverage; and
(2) the possession or consumption of the alcohol by the person under 21 is
not otherwise permitted by this Act; and
(3) the person occupying the residence knows that the person under the age
of 21 leaves the residence in an intoxicated condition.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16(c).
132. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 379. See First Nat'l Bank v. City of Aurora, 373 N.E.2d
1326, 1330 (I11. 1978) (declaring that a person can be civilly liable for the violation of
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known that serving alcohol to minors could result in an automobile
accident. 33 Accordingly, the court concluded that the social host
could be civilly liable under the violation of statute.
34
The Cravens court then addressed the plaintiff's claim under the Illi-
nois Premises Liability Act. 3' This statute requires landowners to use
reasonable care regarding the premises and the acts done on such
premises.136 The court found that the social host did not exercise such
reasonable care. 137 On the contrary, the court determined that the so-
cial host served alcohol to a number of minors and permitted the mi-
nors to serve each other. 38 Moreover, the court stated that the defen-
dant knew most of the minors had arrived at the party by automo-
bile. 139 Therefore, the court reasoned, the social host could be civilly
liable under the Premises Liability Act.' 4
Persuaded by the opinion of the Cravens court, the Third District
Illinois Appellate Court, in Charles v. Seigfried ("Charles 1"), "41 rec-
ognized social host liability as a valid cause of action. In Charles I, the
court held that the defendant social host could be civilly liable for vio-
lating section 6-16 of the Liquor Control Act during a social gather-
ing. 42 In addition, the court indicated that the defendant may not have
acted reasonably upon his own premises in violation of the Premises
Liability Act. 4 3 Dismissing the defendant's arguments about the role
of stare decisis, the court held that the statute at issue protected the mi-
a criminal statute if the statute protects the class of the plaintiff and aims to prevent the
specific harm suffered by the plaintiff).
133. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 378. Because foreseeability is vital to a violation of
statute analysis, the court limited liability to the following fact specific scenario:
(I) a social host has knowingly served alcohol, and permits the liquor to be
served, to youths under 18 years of age at the social host's residence, (2) the
social host permits the minors' consumption to continue to the point of
intoxication, and (3) the social host allows the inebriated minors to depart
from the residence in a motor vehicle.
Id.
134. Id. at 377-78.
135. Id. at 378.
136. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 130/2 (West 1992), amended by Pub. Act No.
89-7, § 35, 1995 I11. Legis. Serv. 246 (West).
137. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 378.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 623 N.E.2d 1021 (Ii. App. 3d Dist. 1993), rev'd, 651 N.E.2d 154 (I11. 1995);
see supra note 15.
142. Id. at 1024.
143. Id. at 1022. The plaintiff alleged in Count I of his complaint that the defendant
violated the Premises Liability Act. Id. The court held that such a claim stated a cause of
action. Id. at 1025.
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nors from alcohol and prevented injuries caused by intoxicated
drivers.' 44  The court then accepted the new rule, established in
Cravens, which recognized that the furnishing of alcohol to minors
could be the proximate cause of any injuries resulting from the actions
of the intoxicated minor. 45 Therefore, the Charles I court declared,
social hosts could be civilly liable for violations of the Liquor Control
Act and the Premises Liability Act. 46
Deepening the district split even further, the Second District Appel-
late Court, in Bzdek v. Townsley, 147 also held that a social host could
be liable for the injuries caused by a minor guest. 4 8 In Bzdek, the
plaintiff argued that the defendant social host violated section 6-16 of
the Liquor Control Act and, therefore, was civilly liable.' 49 The court
reasoned that the defendant's statutory violations could have proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's injuries.150 Although the court did rec-
ognize the growing district split, the court, nevertheless, acknowl-
edged the correctness of the Cravens decision.' 5 '
Thus, after the Bzdek decision, the five Illinois appellate district
courts stood divided on the issue of social host liability. The First,'
52
Second, 53 and Third 54 Districts held in favor of social host liability,
while the Fourth' 55 and Fifth 56 Districts rejected the theory.
144. Id. at 1024. The Charles I court applied the traditional Illinois rule when decid-
ing if the violation of a statute constituted prima facie evidence of negligence and noted
that a minor does not qualify as an "able-bodied man" under the traditional rule. Id. See
supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the Premises Liability Act).
145. Charles 1, 623 N.E.2d at 1024-25. The court conceded that it did "not undertake
lightly the overturning of longstanding precedent." Id. at 1024. Nevertheless, the court
did recognize that the court had the duty to conform the common law to the changing
needs of society. Id. Because "[i]nexperience, peer pressure, physical and psychologi-
cal differences aggregate to distinguish" minors from adults, the "able-bodied man"
principle, which places the responsibility of alcohol consumption on the person con-
suming, is not dispositive of the case at bar. Id.
146. Id. at 1025.
147. 634 N.E.2d 389 (111. App. 2d Dist. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Charles H, 651 N.E.2d
at 154.
148. Id. at 395.
149. Id. at 390-91 (setting out the elements of § 6-16 of the Liquor Control Act). See
supra note 131 and accompanying text.
150. Bzdek, 634 N.E.2d at 391-93.
15 1. Id. at 392. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Id. at 394.
152. Cravens, 586 N.E.2d at 377.
153. Bzdek, 634 N.E.2d at 395.
154. Charles 1, 623 N.E.2d at 1024.
155. Miller v. Moran, 421 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 1981).
156. Holtz v. Amax Zinc Co., 519 N.E.2d 54, 58 (Il1. App. 5th Dist. 1988).
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III. DISCUSSION
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Charles v. Seigfried'57 ("Charles
IF'), resolved the issue of whether a social host whose intoxicated mi-
nor guests cause injuries may be held liable for these injuries.'58 The
court's decision consolidated the issues and facts presented in the two
cases that had deepened the district split, Charles I and Bzdek. 5 9 In
the consolidated appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appel-
late courts' holding that social hosts could be civilly liable for injuries
caused by their intoxicated minor guests.' 6° The court, despite a two
justice dissent, held that social hosts cannot be held liable for the
injuries caused by any intoxicated guest.' 6'
A. The Facts and the Lower Courts' Opinions
Lynn Sue Charles's parents sued Alan Seigfried after sixteen-year-
old Lynn Sue was killed in a car crash upon leaving Seigfried's party,
where he served alcohol to Lynn Sue. 162 Alan Seigfried, an adult,
hosted the party at his home on the evening of February 15, 1991.163
Lynn Sue Charles attended the party with a number of friends.1
64
Seigfried supplied alcohol to the minors and encouraged the minors to
drink, despite Seigfried's knowledge that the minors had driven to the
party. 165 After consuming the alcohol, the minors became intoxicated
but, nevertheless, decided to drive home. 166 Lynn Sue Charles died in
an automobile accident during the drive home.
167
Claiming that the social host was civilly liable for the death of his
daughter, the father of the decedent filed suit in the Circuit Court of
Hancock County. 168 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defen-
dant was liable under the Premises Liability Act and violations of the
Liquor Control Act. 169 The court granted the defendant host's motion
157. 651 N.E.2d 154 (111. 1995).
158. Id. at 155.
159. Id. at 155-56.
160. Id. at 165.
161. Id. at 159.
162. Id. at 155.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 155-56.
165. Id. at 155. See also Charles i, 623 N.E.2d at 1022 (setting out the facts of
Charles 1).
166. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 156. "Lynn Sue had a blood alcohol content of 0.299
at the time of her death." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 155.
169. Id. at 156.
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to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. 70 On appeal, how-
ever, the appellate court for the Third District reversed, holding that
social hosts could be held liable for injuries caused by their intoxicated
minor guests.' 7 '
Similarly, in Bzdek, Susan Townsley and her sister were sued
based upon the theory of social host liability.77 The sisters hosted a
party at their home on September 15, 1990.' 7' The hosts served alco-
hol to Paula Bzdek and other minors, despite the hosts' knowledge
that their guests were minors. 74 Many of the minors drank to intoxi-
cation, and with the knowledge of the social host, departed the gather-
ing in their automobiles. 75 Bzdek suffered serious injuries in an au-
tomobile accident during the drive home. 176
Bzdek filed suit in Lake County, claiming that the social host was li-
able for her injuries.' 77 The plaintiff argued that the defendant should
be held liable under violations of the Liquor Control Act. 78 The cir-
cuit court dismissed the action. 7 9 On appeal, the appellate court re-
versed, holdin, that social hosts can be liable for the injuries of their
minor guests.'
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. The Majority Decision
On the consolidated appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
both appellate court decisions, and held that social hosts cannot be
civilly liable for injuries caused by their guests.'' In Charles II, the
court reaffirmed that the Dramshop Act preempted all alcohol related
common law liability in Illinois, and held that the Dramshop Act pro-
vides the exclusive remedy under the Liquor Control Act. 82 In addi-
170. Charles I1, 651 N.E.2d at 155.
171. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
172. Bzdek v. Townsley, 634 N.E.2d 389, 390 (11. App. 2d Dist. 1994), rev'd sub
nom. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 154.
173. Id.
174. Id. At the time of the accident, Paula Bzdek was age 15, and the driver of the car,
David Duff, was age 18. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. According to Bzdek, she allowed herself to be transported by Duff because of
her own inebriation. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 394.
179. Id. at 390.
180. Id. at 395.
181. Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 165.
182. Id. at 157-58. Declaring that no common law claim of social host liability
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tion, the court, relying on stare decisis, determined that the judiciary
was ill-equipped to modify the traditional rule against social host
liability, noting that any judicial change in the law would be a usurpa-
tion of the legislative power.'83 The court further noted that the
General Assembly addressed and made efforts to remedy the problem
of minor drinking, and expressly decided against imposing civil liabil-
ity on social hosts.8 4 Finally, the court rejected a number of the dis-
sent's arguments.1
8 5
The Charles II court dismissed the plaintiff's common law claim,
ruling that the Dramshop Act preempts all alcohol-related liability.8
6
The court explained that in Cruse, the Illinois Supreme Court declared
that social host liability did not exist under the common law.8 7
Rather, as the Cruse court stated, the only cause of action against a
commercial seller was purely statutory.8 8  Next, citing the Cunning-
ham decision, the court established the preemptory effect of the
Dramshop Act, a rule of law that Illinois courts have consistently fol-
lowed. 8 9  Because the Dramshop Act preempts the common law
development of alcohol related liability, the Charles II court held, so-
cial host liability does not exist in Illinois.' 90 Accordingly, the
supreme court ruled that a common law cause of action against social
hosts does not exist in Illinois.' 9'
exists, or has ever existed in Illinois, the court noted that the General Assembly
"created a limited statutory cause of action when it enacted the original Dramshop Act of
1872 in response to a great wave of temperance reform that swept the nation." Id. at
157.
183. Id. at 159-60.
184. Id. at 162-63.
185. Id. at 164-65.
186. Id. at 159.
187. Id. at 157. The court declared:
The discussion below demonstrates that it has been, and continues to be, well-
established law that Illinois has no common law cause of action for injuries
arising out of the sale or gift of alcoholic beverages; that the legislature has
preempted the field of alcohol-related liability; and that any change in the law
governing alcohol-related liability should be made by the General Assembly,
or not at all.
id. at 156.
188. Id. at 157. The court declared that it "has spoken with a single voice to the ef-
fect that no social host liability exists in Illinois." Id. at 156.
189. Id. at 158-59.
190. Id.
19 1. Id. at 159. The court stated: "As a result, few rules of law are as clear as that no
liability for the sale or gift of alcoholic beverages exists in Illinois outside of the
Dramshop Act." Id. at 158.
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Recognizing that courts have continually interpreted the Dramshop
Act to preempt all alcohol-related liability, the supreme court refused to
change the preemptory interpretation of the Act. 192 The court estab-
lished that stare decisis weighs more heavily on the interpretations of
statutes than on the interpretations of the common law.' 93 The
supreme court explained that if the court changed the past interpretation
of the Dramshop Act, then the judiciary would be, in effect, amending
the statute. 194 The court noted that the amendment of a statute, which
is a legislative process, belongs exclusively to the General Assem-
bly. 195 Additionally, the supreme court supported its reliance on stare
decisis by reasoning that the General Assembly was aware of the judi-
ciary's preemptory interpretation of the Dramshop Act and never en-
acted a change to that interpretation. 96 The General Assembly, ac-
cording to the supreme court, must therefore have acquiesced in this
interpretation of the statute. 97
Moreover, the court reasoned that stare decisis was not the only ob-
stacle to changing the law. 98 The court stressed that only the General
Assembly could make a change regarding an issue as complicated as
social host liability.' 99 The court noted that the imposition of social
host liability is a major public policy issue, and only the General As-
192. Id. at 159.
193. Id. at 159-60. The court referred to its earlier statements in Froud v. Celotex
Corp., 456 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Iii. 1983), where it declared:
Considerations of stare decisis weigh more heavily in the area of statutory
construction than in the latter area because such a departure .. . amounts to an
amendment of the statute itself rather than simply a change in the thinking of
the judiciary with respect to common law concepts which are properly under
its control.
Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 159-60 (citing Froud v. Celotex Corp., 456 N.E.2d at 137 (I11.
1983)).
194. Id. at 160.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 159. The court recognized that "it is apparent that the legislature has ac-
quiesced in the court's construction of the statute, which has by now become part of the
fabric of the Dramshop Act." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 160.
199. Id. The court explained:
The primary expression of Illinois public and social policy should emanate
from the legislature. This is especially true regarding issues like the present
one, where there is disagreement on whether a new rule is warranted. The
members of our General Assembly, elected to their offices by the citizenry of
this State, are best able to determine whether a change in the law is desirable
and workable.
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sembly could competently consider the competing interests. 20 0 Ac-
cording to the court, these competing factors included the standard of
conduct for social hosts, the limitation on liability, and the possible
effects on homeowners' and renters' insurance.20 ' Moreover, the
court explained, it could not fashion a comprehensive modification in
the law because the judiciary can only consider one case at a time.20 2
The judiciary, the supreme court stated, is simply "ill-equipped" to
construct a law on a complex issue like social host liability. °3
In addition to respecting the role of the General Assembly, the
supreme court recognized the importance of the fact that the legislature
had attempted, but failed, to enact social host liability for minors.2°
The court discussed the failed house bills that would have created a
remedy against a social host whose minor guests caused injury. 20 5
The supreme court added that the General Assembly has worked dili-
gently against drunk driving, enacting stiffer penalties for intoxicated
drivers and raising the criminal penalty for serving alcohol to mi-
nors. 206 The legislature, concluded the court, has deliberately deter-
200. Id. Adding to its judicial restraint argument, the court explained:
Any decision to expand civil liability to social hosts should be made only
after a thorough analysis of the relevant considerations. The General
Assembly, by its very nature, has a superior ability to gather and synthesize
data pertinent to the issue. It is free to solicit information and advice from the
many public and private organizations that may be impacted. Moreover, it is
the only entity with the power to weigh and properly balance the many
competing societal, economic, and policy considerations involved.
Id.
201. Id. The Charles I1 court pointed out that the judicial creation of social host lia-
bility would leave social hosts with unlimited liability. Id. at. 161. Unlike dramshop
liability, which is limited by the Act itself, social host liability could not be limited by
a judicial decision. Id. at 160-61. Only the legislature can enact limited liability. Id. at
161.
202. Id. at 160.
203. Id. The court contrasted its role with that of the legislature. Id. The supreme
court stated: "This court, on the other hand, is ill-equipped to fashion a law on this sub-
ject that would best serve the people of Illinois. We can consider only one case at a time
and are constrained by the facts before us." Id.
204. Id. at 162.
205. Id. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (listing failed legislative
initiatives).
206. Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 162-63. The court stated, "Despite its successes, the
General Assembly continues to lead vigorously the fight against underage drunk driving.
Its legislation appropriately targets both the adults who provide alcoholic beverages to
underage persons and the underage persons themselves." Id. at 162. The court further
noted that the General Assembly recently enacted a statute that creates a civil remedy
against any person who rents a motel room for the purpose of furnishing alcohol to mi-
nors. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-21(a) (West 1992). Moreover, the court
noted that the General Assembly recently increased the criminal penalty for furnishing
alcohol to underage persons. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16 (West 1992 &
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mined that social host liability is not the best solution to the drunk
driving problem. 0 7 Accordingly, the supreme court decided that it
should not create a rule which the legislature has clearly decided
against.20
8
After determining that only the legislature is equipped to fashion a
new rule on social host liability, the supreme court responded to three
of the dissent's arguments. 209 First, the court rejected the existence of
a national trend in favor of social host liability.2 0 The court explained
that the existence of a national trend in favor of social host liability is,
at best, unclear. 1 In addition, even assuming a national trend did
exist, the court stated that its decision should be grounded only in Illi-
nois law.212
Second, the court rejected the dissent's claim that social host liability
is required to protect victims of drunk driving accidents, finding no
evidence to support such an assertion. 21 3 Finally, the court rejected
the dissent's claim that the Dramshop Act only preempted alcohol re-
lated liability for injuries caused by intoxicated guests.2'4 The court
emphasized that it has interpreted the Dramshop Act to preempt the
common law development of all alcohol related liability.2"5
Supp. 1996).
207. Charles !1, 651 N.E.2d at 163.
208. Id. at 164. The court explained that "Uludicial action in the face of these leg-
islative decisions would be ill-advised." Id.
209. Id. at 161, 163-64.
210. Id. at 161. The Charles I1 court demonstrated that, contrary to the dissent's wish
to allow any injured party to recover against a social host, some states permit only third
parties to recover against social hosts. Id. Also, the court noted that a number of state
legislatures, rather than state courts, enacted social host liability. Id. See also supra
notes 92-94 and accompanying text (noting four states whose legislatures have enacted
social host liability).
211. Charles !!, 651 N.E.2d at 161. The court stated, "The dissent agrees with the
plaintiffs, claiming that 26 states have adopted the view which it endorses. An analysis
of the law of other jurisdictions reveals otherwise." Id.
212. Id. The court noted that it was "of the view that its decision should be grounded
upon the law of Illinois rather than upon contradictory trends elsewhere." Id.
213. Id. at 164. The court stated:
The dissent's statements do not withstand scrutiny. The victims of underage
drunk driving have always had, and will continue to have, a civil remedy.
They can sue the drunk driver, who is undoubtedly at fault. We have not been
presented with any evidence to suggest that this civil remedy'is insufficient.
Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 164.
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2. The Dissent
In her dissenting opinion, Justice McMorrow 1 6 argued that the
supreme court should allow a remedy against social hosts whose
intoxicated minor guests caused injuries. 7 Dismissing the majority's
holding that the Dramshop Act preempted common law social host li-
ability, Justice McMorrow argued that the traditional interpretation
against social host liability should be changed.1 8 She added that stare
decisis should not preclude a change in the law, especially in light of
drunk driving tragedies and a persuasive national trend in favor of
creating a remedy against social hosts.21 9
Justice McMorrow first dismissed the traditional Cunningham inter-
pretation that the Dramshop Act preempts alcohol-related liability. 220
Adopting the reasoning of the appellate court in Cravens, she argued
that the Dramshop Act does not expressly or impliedly preempt the
common law liability of alcohol.2  She emphasized that it was not
logical to construe the Dramshop Act to preempt social host liability
when the statute does not speak to that issue.
Dismissing the preemption argument, Justice McMorrow then ar-
gued for the modification of the traditional common law rule against
social host liability. She noted that the common law rule was anti-
quated and that the tragic consequences of underage drunk driving re-
quired a reconsideration of the traditional common law rule.224 Justice
McMorrow explained that the Cruse decision did not consider the dif-
ferences between a minor and an adult.22 5 She stated that minors are
216. Justice Harrison joined in the dissent. Id. at 165 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 164 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 167 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 170 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 167 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow argued that "the
Dramshop Act, in neither its express terms nor its underlying intent and purpose, makes
any reference to and in no way precludes social host liability for the provision of alco-
hol to a minor." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice McMorrow,
while an appellate justice, authored the opinion in Cravens. See Cravens v. Inman, 586
N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1991).
222. Charles 1I, 651 N.E.2d at 167 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). She argued that "[i]t
is illogical to construe a statute so that it says something about a topic on which the
statute is clearly silent." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 167-68 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Once Justice McMorrow had con-
cluded that the Dramshop Act did not preempt the development of alcohol related liabil-
ity, she could consider the validity of the common law rule.
224. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow noted that the common law
must be reconsidered "in light of the present day reality of the needless carnage and de-
struction wrought by underage drunk driving." Id. at 168 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 167 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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not the able-bodied adults discussed by the Cruse court, but, rather,
they are children who are unable to make educated decisions about al-
cohol consumption. 26 Therefore, she reasoned, those who furnish al-
cohol to minors can be liable for injuries caused by the intoxicated
minors.227
Supporting her argument for a modification of the common law,
Justice McMorrow emphasized that stare decisis did not preclude a
modification in the traditional rule against social host liability. 228 She
stressed that the law is not static. 229 On the contrary, she stated, the
law should change in accordance with the demands of society. Jus-
tice McMorrow explained that the judiciary has the duty to change the
common law as the demands of society change.23' Moreover, Justice
McMorrow argued that a state of inaction exists between the judiciary
and the legislature because both branches have been waiting for the
other to enact social host liability. 2  As a consequence of this inac-
tion, she argued, the court has the duty to change the law.233
Justice McMorrow noted that other policy considerations dictated a
change in the law. 4 First, she observed that many other state courts
have not hesitated to create a remedy against social hosts.235 She
226. Id. at 168 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow stated: "[C]hildren
as a class are simply incompetent by reason of their youth and inexperience to deal re-
sponsibly with the effects of alcohol." Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing Ely v.
Murphy, 540 A.2d 54, 57 (Conn. 1988)). See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying
text (discussing minors' inability to consume alcohol responsibly).
227. Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 168 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 168-69 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 169 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow argued that "this court's
view of stare decisis has never been used, as the majority does in the present cause, as an
excuse for judicial inaction that amounts to an abandonment of this court's duty to guide
and develop the common law of this State." Id. at 168-69. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 168 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow explained:
We believe that the proper relationship between the legislature and the court is
one of cooperation and assistance in examining and changing the common
law to conform with the ever changing demands of the community. There are,
however, times when there exists a mutual state of inaction in which the court
awaits action by the legislature and the legislature awaits guidance from the
court. Such a stalemate is a manifest injustice to the public. When such a
stalemate exists and the legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to act to
remedy a gap in the common law that results in injustice, it is the imperative
duty of the court to repair that injustice ....
Id. at 169. (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (citing Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (111.
1981)).
233. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 170. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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found that over twenty-six states have adopted social host liability for
236 Ti aiminors. This national trend, Justice McMorrow argued, reflects the
contemporary understanding that adults who serve alcohol to minors
must be responsible for the injuries caused by those minors.237 Justice
McMorrow added that the injuries caused by those minors came with
tragic consequences.238 She noted that these consequences suggest
that social host liability is required to provide plaintiffs with a rem-
edy. 239 In conclusion, Justice McMorrow argued that social host lia-
bility was necessary to deter adults from serving alcohol to minors.24
IV. ANALYSIS
The Illinois Supreme Court correctly ruled that under the current
state of Illinois law, social hosts cannot be held liable for injuries
caused by their minor guests. 24' First, the supreme court properly
applied well established precedent to the issue of social host liabil-
ity.242 Moreover, the supreme court's decision reflects the proper
roles of the judiciary and the General Assembly under the Illinois
Constitution.243 Despite the correctness of the decision, however, the
reasoning of the court should be narrowly construed.244
A. The Supreme Court's Reasoning
1. The Importance of Precedent
In Charles II, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly applied precedent
when it determined that social host liability does not exist. In the
236. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow added an appendix listing
the 26 states that have created a remedy against social hosts. Id. at 173-74.
(McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow claimed that the states of Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin have adopted social host liability. Id. (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 166-68 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 171-72 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 172-73 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 173 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow noted that, until the
legislature acts, "adults who host parties where minors are allowed to become inebriated
and then drive a vehicle will have less incentive to change their ways." Id. (McMorrow,
J., dissenting).
241. See infra part IV.A.
242. See infra notes 245-74 and accompanying text.
243. See infra notes 275-304 and accompanying text.
244. See infra notes 305-14 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 61-70 (discussing the historic Illinois rule against social host
liability).
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Cunningham decision, the supreme court held that the Dramshop Act
preempted all alcohol related liability." 6 Since the Cunningham deci-
sion, courts have consistently adhered to this interpretation of the
Dramshop Act.247 Illinois appellate courts have not only held that the
Dramshop Act preempts civil liability for commercial sellers of alcohol;
courts have also held that the Dramshop Act preempts all alcohol
related liability in Illinois. 248 Therefore, the preemptory effect of the
Dramshop Act dictates that civil liability cannot exist by virtue of either
a general negligence theory or a common law violation of statute.
2. The Importance of Stare Decisis
Although the Charles II court had the power to change the preemp-
tory effect of the Dramshop Act, the supreme court correctly invoked
stare decisis in light of the historical precedence of rejecting social host
liability in Illinois. 249 Generally, stare decisis reflects the philosophy
that judges are not policymakers 250 but, rather, are interpreters of the
law.25 ' For instance, many Illinois courts have cited the tragic conse-
quences of social hosts who serve alcohol to minors.252 While this
concern has clearly tempted those courts to modify the common law
246. See Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (I11. 1961).
247. See supra part I.B.
248. See supra part Il.B.
249. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 159.
250. Illinois judges are elected, not appointed. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 12(a).
However, this does not alter this analysis because they are not elected as legislatures,
but, rather, as interpreters of the law.
25 1. See generally Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986) (stare decisis guar-
antees that the law is founded in principles and not the "proclivities of individuals");
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(claiming that it is better that "the law to be settled than that it be settled right"); Justice
William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949) (claiming that
there will be no equal justice under the law if negligence principles are applied "in the
morning but not in the afternoon"); Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The
Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 201 (1989)
(noting that the court's role as the adjudicator prevents it from changing the law);
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 281, 286 (1990) (noting that stare decisis preserves the integrity of the court).
Justice Powell declared that the legitimacy of the court, its integrity in the eyes of the
public and other branches of government, exists because the court is not comprised of
judges that write their own public policy into law. See id. at 286-87.
Both Justice Douglas and Justice Brandeis have agreed, however, that stare decisis may
not be as important when the interpretation of the Constitution is at issue, primarily be-
cause constitutional interpretations are extremely difficult to change through the leg-
islative process. See Burnet, 285 U.S. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Douglas, supra,
at 736-37.
252. See Estate of Ritchie v. Farrell, 572 N.E.2d 367, 369 (I11. App. 3d. Dist. 1991);
Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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rule against social host liability, most Illinois courts have refused to
revise the law, preferring instead that elected representatives make any
changes.253
In addition to protecting the law from the preferences of individual
judges, stare decisis also ensures continuity in the law.254 If, for ex-
ample, the Illinois Supreme Court decided to modify the rule against
social host liability, thousands of Illinois residents who serve alcohol
to minors at innocuous social gatherings could suddenly be exposed to
massive financial liability. 5  Illinois citizens cannot make informed
decisions from nebulous law.256 Yet, by changing the rule against so-
253. See generally Estate of Ritchie, 572 N.E.2d at 369-70 (stating that although the
loss of life and property warrants a re-examination of the law, elected representatives
should make the change); Puckett v. Mr. Lucky's Ltd., 529 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (II1. App.
4th Dist. 1988). In Puckett, the court conceded that the plaintiffs claim against a social
host had validity. Puckett, 529 N.E.2d at 1170. Nevertheless, the court, recognizing
the precedent against the plaintiff's argument, dismissed the plaintiff's claim and de-
clared that any change in the law should come from elected representatives. Id.
254. See Powell, supra note 251, at 286. Justice Powell declares that stare decisis is
vital to stability in the law. Id. He writes: "Even in the area of personal rights, stare
decisis is necessary to have a predictable set of rules on which citizens may rely in shap-
ing their behavior." Id.
255. See Sparlin, supra note 1, at 617. In her dissent, Justice McMorrow claimed
that the Charles II Court's refusal to change the law permits adults to serve alcohol to
minors. Charles I, 651 N.E.2d at 165 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Yet courts have
denied that their refusal to create social host liability should be taken as implied
approval of serving alcohol to minors. See, e.g., Zamiar v. Linderman, 478 N.E.2d
534, 535 (111. App. 1st. Dist. 1985). In Zamiar, the plaintiff claimed that the court
would be giving its blessing to adults who serve alcohol to minors if the court failed to
establish a cause of action against social hosts. Id. The court stated: "While we do not
wish to be so understood, we must nonetheless decline plaintiff's invitation to conjure a
common law cause of action." Id.
In addition, serving alcohol to minors continues to be a crime. See ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16(a) (West Supp. 1995) (amended by Pub. Act. No. 89-250, § 5,
1995 II1. Legis. Serv. 3009 (West)) (providing for criminal penalties for serving alco-
hol to a minor); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16(c) (providing for criminal
penalties for serving alcohol to a minor at a social gathering).
256. See Powell, supra note 251, at 286 (perhaps the most important and familiar ar-
gument for stare decisis is one of the legitimacy of the judiciary). See also Douglas,
supra note 251, at 735-36 (noting that stare decisis provides "moorings" for the deci-
sions of people in their daily affairs). Arguably, social hosts of all sorts could be com-
pletely risk adverse, avoiding any possible opportunity for a minor to receive alcohol.
How risk adverse would a social host have to be, though? The Charles IH court stated:
Accidents following a wedding, for example, would include the typical targets
of the bride, the groom, the servers, and anyone else who may have handed the
underage person a drink. Courts and jurors would then be faced with evaluating
the social host's conduct. For example: Did the social host do enough to stop
the underage drinker from his or her own illegal actions? Did the host check
identification to determine the guests' ages? Should the host have allowed
underage persons to be present? Could the host have done more to prevent a
guest's departure?
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cial host liability, the court would place the law in a state of flux.257
The court would require years to settle the numerous questions pre-
sented by the implementation of social host liability.25 8 Stare decisis
prevents this legal confusion and provides the consistency in the law
that citizens need to formulate basic decisions about providing alcohol
at social gatherings.259
Stare decisis also limits the power of a court to modify an original
interpretation of a statute, such as the Dramshop Act,260 and guaran-
tees that the legislature will not become irresponsible and unaccount-
able to the electorate. 26' For example, if the General Assembly be-
lieves that the judiciary will reinterpret statutes to reflect changing
times, then it may simply leave the work of statutory revision to the
judiciary. 262 This would allow the legislature to avoid its responsibil-
Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 164.
257. See Michael J. Dittoe, Statutory Revision by Common Law Courts and The
Nature of Legislative Decision Making-A Response to Professor Calabresi, 28 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 235, 235-37 (1984). Dittoe notes that "while a legislature can propose,
consider, and pass such a rule sua sponte," courts require wronged litigants who appear
over a long stretch of time in order to formulate the law fully. Id. at 255. As a result,
questions in the law may take years to answer through the judicial system. In the case of
social host liability, for instance, would a social host be liable only to a third party? At
what age would a minor be considered an able bodied adult? Would the social host merely
have to know of alcohol being served, or would the social host be required to actually
physically serve the minor? Most importantly, what kind of financial limits would be
placed on the liability of social hosts? A cap on recovery is an issue that would have to
be solved by the legislature. For more of these questions, see the majority opinion in
Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 160.
258. See supra note 257 and accompanying text for some of the unanswered ques-
tions.
259. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
260. See generally Froud v. Celotex Corp, 456 N.E.2d 131, 137 (II1. 1983) (stating
that considerations of stare decisis weigh more heavily in the area of statutory construc-
tion); Union Elec. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 396 N.E.2d 510, 517 (I1l. 1979)
(noting that previous decisions of the court demonstrate that the statute has been consis-
tently construed); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 253
(1994) (acknowledging that erroneous statutory precedents can be changed by the legis-
lature); Frank E. Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX.
L. REV. 205, 249 (1949) (recognizing that a supreme court's initial interpretation of a
statute becomes part of statute); Edward H. Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U.
CHI. L. REV. 501, 523 (1948) (arguing that stare decisis should be dispositive on the
interpretation of a general statute); Powell, supra note 251, at 287 (noting that stare
decisis should be used with "a special vigor" in statutory cases because Congress has the
power to change any flawed judicial interpretation).
261. See Levi, supra note 260, at 523; Marshall, supra note 251, at 208. Marshall
writes: "By pointing to the possibility that the courts will revisit the issue, or by oth-
erwise suggesting that the issue is best dealt with by the judiciary, a legislator can avoid
the political heat that sponsoring or voting for legislation to overrule the decision may
spark." Id. at 211.
262. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
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ity to formulate public policy2 63 because the legislature could avoid
controversy by deferring to the judiciary.2
By refusing to change the rule against social host liability, however,
the supreme court clearly demonstrated that only the General Assembly
should change the law.265 The Charles II decision appropriately forces
the legislature to take a stand on this controversial issue.266 If the
General Assembly does not modify the supreme court's decision, then
it clearly acquiesces in the court's holding.267 On the other hand, any
legislative modification of the Charles II decision signifies that Illinois'
legislators are interested in expanding the remedies for injured plain-
tiffs.26 Thus, the electorate is able to hold a branch of government ac-
countable for the legal status of social host liability. 269
263. See Levi, supra note 260, at 523. Levi notes that if the controversy is great,
and the court is expected to reinterpret legislation, then "it is not to be expected . . . that
the legislature will ever act." Id.
264. See Marshall, supra note 251, at 211-12. See also Levi, supra note 260, at 523
(recognizing that controversial changes in the law should be made by the legislature).
265. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 160-61. See also Marshall, supra note 251, at 213-
14. Marshall noted the problem that results when it is not clear which branch has
responsibility to change an interpretation of law. Id. at 213. He concluded:
The flaw, then, in the current system of shared authority to overrule statutory
precedents is that no one body is given the ultimate job of reviewing
interpretations of statutes and deciding whether they represent currently
acceptable renditions of the statute's goals, or for that matter, whether the
statute is worth keeping around at all. This diffusion of authority lessens the
probability of statutory development.
Id. at 215.
266. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
267. Courts will almost always infer legislative acquiescence of a judicial interpreta-
tion if the legislature does not act to correct the court's interpretation. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-87 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that congressional silence is indicative of acqui-
escence in the Court's interpretation of a statute); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S.
469, 488 (1940) (noting that congressional failure to amend a judicial interpre-tation
presumes legislative acquiescence); Union Elec. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 396
N.E.2d 510, 517-18 (Ill. 1979) (declaring that legislative acquiescence is to be presumed
when the legislature does not amend a judicial interpretation but does make other
changes to a comprehensive act). But see Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 82 (1984) (arguing
that "it is improper to transform a congressional failure to legislate into the equivalent
of legislation"). See also supra note 196 and accompanying text (quoting Charles !1,
651 N.E.2d at 159, for the proposition that legislative acquiescence in judicial interpre-
tation of a statute allows for that interpretation to become part of the act).
268. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 252 (1975). See also
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-128.5 (West 1990) (modifying the traditional rule
against imposing liability on social hosts). See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying
text (discussing the Colorado legislature's change to the traditional common law rule).
269. See Levi, supra note 260, at 523. Levi notes that the mechanism for holding a
legislator accountable, regular elections, is easier for the electorate than the mechanism
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Not only does statutory stare decisis force the legislature to be ac-
countable, but it prevents the judiciary from amending the original
meaning of statutes. 7 ° In Cunningham, the supreme court first inter-
preted the Dramshop Act's effect on other alcohol related remedies
when it held that the Dramshop Act preempted all common law liability
for alcohol.27I This interpretation reflected legislative intent.2  There-
fore, if the Charles II court had changed this preemptory interpretation,
then the supreme court would be effectively amending the Dramshop
Act. 273  The power to amend statutes belongs only to the General
Assembly. 74
3. The Commitment to the Separation of Powers
In accordance with the Illinois Constitution, the Charles H court cor-
rectly acknowledged that the power to amend statutes resides in the
legislature.2 75 The Illinois Constitution explicitly declares that no
branch of government may exercise the power of any other branch. 7 6
The judiciary only has the power to interpret the laws of the legislature;
it does not have the power to amend laws and thus determine the pub-
lic policy of the state.277 By refusing to change its interpretation of the
for holding judges accountable. Id.
270. See DICKERSON, supra note 268, at 253. Dickerson writes:
If it [the court] interprets the statute correctly, fine. If it interprets the statute
incorrectly, the court must live with its mistake until the legislature corrects
it. . . . Because only a legislature can amend a statute, only a legislature can
correct such a judicial error. Accordingly, for the court to correct its mistake
would usurp the legislature's function.
Id. See also Horack, supra note 260, at 251-52 (arguing that, once a court has inter-
preted a statute, only a legislature can change the interpretation); Levi, supra note 260,
at 523 (noting that changes to statutes can only be made by the legislature).
271. Cunningham v. Brown, 174 N.E.2d 153, 156 (I11. 1961).
272. Id. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
273. See Horack, supra note 260, at 248-49 (stating that the judiciary cannot amend a
statute); Levi, supra note 260, at 523 (recognizing that the judiciary exceeds its desig-
nated role when it amends statutes).
274. See infra notes 275-304 and accompanying text.
275. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. IV, § I (vesting the legislative power in the General
Assembly).
276. Id. ("The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are separate. No branch
shall exercise powers properly belonging to the other."). Clearly, then, the judiciary
cannot exercise the legislative function without exceeding its constitutional role.
277. See generally DICKERSON, supra note 268, at 253 (recognizing the legislature's
role as that of chief policymaker for society); David A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation
and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEo L.J. 281, 283 (1989) (explaining that the legislature
is the supreme policy maker in a state); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)
(arguing that the "interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts"). Hamilton also noted that "courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they
should be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequence would equally
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Dramshop Act, the Charles II court avoided usurping the constitutional
role of the General Assembly. 8 Therefore, the court's decision pre-
serves the separation of powers declared in the Illinois Constitution,279
the ultimate embodiment of law.280
Additionally, in its refusal to usurp the constitutional role of the
General Assembly, the Charles II decision reaffirms the legislature's
superior ability to formulate clear, comprehensive laws regarding
complex issues. 281 For instance, if social host liability existed in
Illinois, common prudence would demand that all potential social hosts
carry some kind of liability insurance.282 The high cost of this insur-
ance could prevent many innocuous social gatherings.283 Even if a
social host did acquire insurance, social hosts may not have the experi-
ence to recognize drunk minor guests.2 4 While taverns and commer-
cial sellers regularly deal with intoxicated customers, social hosts
might be unable to prevent an intoxicated minor guest from driving.285
Moreover, social hosts, unlike commercial vendors, do not have em-
ployees who can control intoxicated guests.28 6 These issues illustrate
the complexity of formulating any law relating to social host liability.
As the designated policymaking branch of government, the General
Assembly can more competently balance these highly controversial is-
sues surrounding social host liability in Illinois.287
be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body." Id.; Horack, supra
note 260, at 250 (claiming that it is understood in a democratic society that the legisla-
ture determines public policy).
278. Horack, supra note 260, at 249 (noting that the court usurps the legislature's
role when the court engages in policy making).
279. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
280. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the Constitution is
superior to the will of the legislature and must guide the decisions of the judiciary).
281. See Marshall, supra note 251, at 201. Marshall writes: "If separation of powers
means anything, it means that the task of creating law falls upon the legislature, and the
courts must obey and enforce the constitutionally legitimate enactments of the legisla-
tive branch. It is the legislative branch which ... is answerable to the people . I..." Id
See also DICKERSON, supra note 268, at 253 (claiming that any judicial change in the
interpretation of a statute usurps the legislature's constitutional role).
282. Sparlin, supra note I, at 620.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 619.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. The Illinois Supreme Court is hardly the only court to recognize the important
role that the legislature has to play on the issue of social host liability. See Bankston
v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1987) (acknowledging that the court had the
power to change the rule but that the legislature is better equipped to change a law that
has such "broad ramifications"); Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985) (recognizing that the Missouri Constitution has designed the legislature as
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In addition to its superior ability to formulate policy on the issue of
social host liability, 8 the General Assembly can enact a comprehen-
sive rule without relying on litigation.289 If, for example, the judiciary
created social host liability, Illinois law would be in a state of flux for
years290 because the supreme court would be required to resolve issues
on a case by case basis, a process that would assuredly lead to confu-
sion.29' This confusion would provide Illinois citizens with little guid-
ance on issues that could involve huge risks.292 Recognizing the natu-
ral inability of the judiciary to formulate laws which address compli-
cated issues, the Charles II decision protects the General Assembly's
role as Illinois' chief policymaker.293 More importantly, this deference
the branch of government to make decisions of such "widespread repercussions");
Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Va. 1986) (establishing that
the legislature must make any changes to the traditional rule against social host liabil-
ity). Declaring that the judiciary should not abrogate the common law rule against so-
cial host liability, the Williamson court declared:
A legislative change in the law is initiated by introduction of a bill which
serves as public notice to all concerned. The legislature serves as a form for
witnesses representing interests directly affected by the decision. The issue is
tried and tested in the crucible of public debate. The decision reached by the
chosen representatives of the people reflects the will of the body politic. And
when the decision is likely to disrupt the historic balance of competing
values, this effective date can be postponed to give the public time to make
necessary adjustments.
Williamson, 350 S.E.2d at 624 (quoting Bruce Farms v. Coupe, 247 S.E.2d 400, 404
(Va. 1978)).
288. Social host liability raises a number of questions that are certainly for the legis-
lature to decide. See, e.g., Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Fla. 1987).
See supra note 256 and accompanying text for a list of the many issues that surround
social host liability.
289. See Dittoe, supra note 257, at 236-37. See supra notes 199-203 and accompa-
nying text.
290. See generally Dittoe, supra note 257, at 254-55 (stating that the court, as adju-
dicator, can only hear one case at time).
291. See Charles I1, 651 N.E.2d at 160-61 (noting that the unresolved points of law
would force Illinois litigants to crowd the courts in search for answers).
292. See Douglas, supra note 251, at 735-36. Justice Douglas notes the importance
of a clear law to people who must make daily decisions. Id. Justice Douglas states that
stare decisis "provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs
with confidence." Id. at 736.
293. See supra note 277 and accompanying text; Farber, supra note 277, at 283
(recognizing that the legislature is the supreme policymaker of the state). Even where
the supreme court has fashioned a complicated law, the court has called for legislative
assistance. See, e.g., In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (11. 1989). In Longeway,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that an individual has the right to refuse life sustaining
medical treatment. Id. at 298. Although the court judicially created this right, the court
reasoned that the legislature was the "appropriate forum" to make new laws and, accord-
ingly, appealed to the legislature to fashion a policy on the so-called "right to die." Id.
at 301.
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to the General Assembly provides Illinois citizens with clear, compre-
hensive laws.294
In contrast to the majority opinion, the dissent's approach disre-
gards the proper role of the legislature.295 Justice McMorrow argued
for the alteration of the long standing preemptory effect of the
Dramshop Act. 296 Justice McMorrow's opinion depended on the exis-
tence of a civil remedy under section 6-16 of the Liquor Control
Act, 297 and hinged on the ability of the court to change the traditional
common law rule against social host liability for injuries caused by
guests. 8 In doing so, her dissent erroneously assumes that the court
can reinterpret a statute.29
See also Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 897 (III. 1981). In Alvis, the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the policy of comparative negligence, discarding the long-stand-
ing Illinois rule of contributory negligence. Id. at 896-97. The court noted that judicial
restraint did not prevent judicial modification of a law when, like contributory negli-
gence, the law was originally of judicial creation. Id. at 898.
294. See Douglas, supra note 251, at 735-36.
295. See infra notes 296-304 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 220-227 and accompanying text. In essence, Justice
McMorrow viewed the interpretation of the legislature's intent in creating the Dramshop
Act differently than the majority. Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 167 (McMorrow, J., dissent-
ing). In Charles II, she claimed the Act only preempted the commercial liability of al-
cohol because the Act does not speak to social host liability. Id. (McMorrow, J., dis-
senting). Yet, her argument fails to recognize that Illinois courts have long interpreted
the Dramshop Act as preempting all alcohol related liability. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
297. Charles I1, 651 N.E.2d at 164 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow
incorporated her opinion in Cravens v. Inman, 586 N.E.2d 367 (I11. App. 1st Dist.
1991), into her Charles H opinion. Id. at 166 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). In Charles
11, the social hosts' violations of the Liquor Control Act were vital to her analysis, as
the plaintiff's second count claimed that the social hosts violated § 6-16 of that statute.
Id. at 156. See also Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 483, 485 (Wash. 1992) (finding a civil
remedy based on the violation of a liquor statute). See supra notes 78-84 and
accompanying text (explaining that some state courts have concluded that when a viola-
tion of a liquor act occurs, the plaintiff should be able to recover for civil liability
against a social host).
298. Charles I1, 651 N.E.2d at 166-67 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Under Justice
McMorrow's approach a social host could be held civilly liable under § 6-16(c) only if
the statutory violations could have proximately caused the injuries to the plaintiff. See
supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the proximate cause requirement of
violation of statute). Thus, Justice McMorrow had to modify the traditional rule, which
declared that furnishing alcohol could never be the proximate cause of any alcohol-
related injuries. Charles 11, 651 N.E.2d at 167 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). See also
Hart v. Ivey, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (N.C. 1992) (announcing that the furnishing of
alcohol can proximately cause alcohol related injuries). See supra notes 86-91 and ac-
companying text (discussing Hart).
299. See Horack, supra note 260, at 251 (recognizing that the separation of powers
forbids the court to change even an incorrect interpretation of a statute).
Justifying her modification of the traditional rule, Justice McMorrow argued that a
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While some scholars argue that the court can exceed its designated
role if the legislature is too busy to enact a change in a judicial interpre-
tation of a statute,3° in the case of social host liability and alcohol re-
lated liability, the Illinois General Assembly has never been "too busy"
to consider the enactment of a civil remedy. 30' The legislature has
often considered the issue of social host liability and consistently
rejected enacting such a law.30 2 Additionally, since the Liquor Control
Act's original passage, the legislature has made changes that directly
affect minors, none of which include a remedy against social hosts.30 3
Clearly, the General Assembly has deliberately chosen not to impose
civil liability on social hosts whose minor guests cause injuries."
minor, unlike an "'able bodied man,"' does not have the experience to make responsible
choices about alcohol. Charles I!, 651 N.E.2d at 167 (McMorrow, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73, 74 (111. 1889)). Even if this distinction between a
minor and an "able bodied man" is valid, the preemptory effect of the Dramshop Act
prohibits the court from applying the distinction to social host liability. See Horack,
supra note 260, at 251; Levi, supra note 260, at 523; Marshall, supra note 251 at 211-
12. Arguably, the Charles 11 majority could have agreed with Justice McMorrow's dis-
tinction. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the majority's
preemptory interpretation of the Dramshop Act prevented them from changing this
common law rule. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 157-59. In Puckett v. Mr. Lucky's Ltd., 529
N.E.2d 1169, (111. App. 4th Dist. 1988), the court conceded that the traditional rule
against liability might be antiquated. Puckett, 529 N.E.2d at 1170. The court stated,
however, that it was "bound by the decisions of our supreme court which have long lim-
ited alcohol related liability to the coverage of the Illinois Dramshop Act." Id.
300. See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers Ill, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example
of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REV. 611, 611-12 (1977). Rogers criti-
cizes statutory stare decisis because he believes that the policy makes an incorrect as-
sumption. Id. He writes: "[T]he reasoning presupposes that legislatures are responsive
to judicial edicts. In many instances, this may not be an accurate presupposition. Leg-
islatures are usually extremely busy while in session." Id.
301. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text for a list of failed bills. Mem-
bers of the General Assembly more actively regulate the consumption of alcohol than
any other area. For a complete look at the General Assembly's active role in liquor regu-
lation, see the cumulative index of the ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST 2522-
24 (1992).
302. See supra notes 102-06 discussing certain unsuccessful, repeated attempts to en-
act social host liability.
303. For instance, the General Assembly enacted a civil remedy against any person
that rents a motel room for a minor with the express purpose of furnishing alcohol to the
minor. Pub. Act No. 84-1380, 1986 Il1. Laws 3139 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 235, § 5/6-21(a) (West 1992)). The legislature has also raised the criminal penalty
for serving alcohol to a minor. Pub. Act No. 88-613 (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 235, § 5/6-16 (West 1992)).
304. See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text.
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B. The Scope of the Supreme Court's Decision
Although the supreme court correctly deferred to the General As-
sembly, the Charles H decision should not be construed too
broadly.30 5 According to Justice McMorrow, the Charles H court
abandons the court's obligation to develop the common law of Illi-
nois.30 6 In fact, the Charles H decision does not relinquish to the
General Assembly the supreme court's control over the development
of the common law.30 7 Rather, the supreme court preserved its
traditional obligation to guide the development of the common law.30 8
The Charles H court refused to reconsider social host liability only be-
cause the Dramshop Act preempted the common law development of
alcohol related liability. 3°9 Thus, the supreme court can still reconsider
common law rules where the legislature has not preempted judicial de-
velopment of the common law.310
Just as the Charles H decision does not relinquish the judiciary's
ability to create new common law rules, neither does it abrogate the
long-standing common law rule that a person may be civilly liable in
negligence for the violation of a statute.3 ' In many cases, a court will
consider a claim based on the violation of a statute, and in such cases,
the violation of a statute will invariably continue to constitute prima
305. See Williamson v. Old Brogue, Inc., 350 S.E.2d 621, 622-24 (Va. 1986). The
Virginia Supreme Court declared that the legislature should make any change to the tradi-
tional common law against social host liability because the court was "ill-suited" to
make such a change. Id. Nevertheless, the court reserved its traditional right to change
the common law. Id. The court declared that Virginia courts operate under the common
law, unless the state's legislature alters the basis for a decision. Id.
306. Charles 1I, 651 N.E.2d at 168-69 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
307. Farber, supra note 277, at 283. Farber points out that statutory stare decisis
does not eliminate the court's ability to develop the common law, despite the legisla-
ture's right to abrogate any judicial rule. Id.
308. See, e.g., In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (l11. 1989) (determining that it
had the power to create a right to rescind medical treatment because the legislature had
not yet entered that particular field). Id. See also Ely v. Murphy, 540 A.2d 54, 57-58
(Conn. 1988) (declaring that the judiciary will always have the power to modify the
common law, unless the legislature has interfered); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896
(Il1. 1981) (holding that stare decisis will not prevent the court from changing judicially
created doctrines and the common law).
309. The Charles H court never held that it was powerless to change the preemptory
interpretation of the Dramshop Act. Charles I, 651 N.E.2d at 160. The court refused to
change the law only because the legislature has played such an active role in alcohol re-
lated liability and is best able to resolve such issues comprehensively. Id.
310. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 312-13 (discussing the reason for the continuing validity of the
violation of statute doctrine).
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facie evidence of negligence." 2 In Charles II, however, the court cor-
rectly declined to create a civil remedy for the violation of the Liquor
Control Act, as it is a comprehensive scheme that regulates virtually all
uses of alcohol and the varied punishments of misuses.31 3
Consequently, the Dramshop Act preempts all alcohol related liabil-
ity. 3
14
V. IMPACT
The Illinois General Assembly will undoubtedly acquiesce in the
Charles II decision. In the past, the legislature has explicitly rejected
any attempt to enact social host liability.31 5 Moreover, a more conser-
vative General Assembly recently acted to limit a plaintiff's ability to
recover for personal injuries.316 The Premises Liability Act was
among the many Illinois laws that was modified to limit liability.1 7
This movement against liability certainly illustrates that the General
Assembly will not amend the Liquor Control Act to include social host
liability.318
Because the legislature will acquiesce, those injured in drunk driv-
ing accidents will only be able to recover from the drunk drivers them-
selves.319 Yet, contrary to the suggestions of Justice McMorrow, this
limitation on potential defendants will not significantly affect the
recoveries of plaintiffs 2.32  While commercial sellers of alcohol invari-
ably have insurance to cover any substantial liability under the
Dramshop Act, social hosts do not have insurance to cover the liability
312. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
313. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/1-1 to 5/11-2 (West 1992).
314. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 156-57.
315. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
316. On March 9, 1995, Governor Edgar signed a bill, effective immediately, that
provided a massive reform of civil liability in Illinois. Pub. Act No. 89-7. § 15, 1995
Ill. Leg. Serv. 224 (West) (codified in scattered sections at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN chs.
430, 730, 735, 740, 745, 815, 820). The law makes major changes in products
liability and repeals joint liability. Id. See also Abdon M. Pallasch, To Cap or Not to
Cap: The Tort Battle of '95, CHi. LAW., March 1995, at I (recognizing the newly elected
conservative General Assembly that is committed to passing caps on the amount a
plaintiff can recover in a personal injury suit).
317. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 130/2 (West Supp. 1996) (amending ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, § 130/1 (West 1992)).
3 18. See supra note 316 (discussing the General Assembly's efforts to curb civil lia-
bility).
319. Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 172-73 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (noting the great
injustice to plaintiffs because they will be unable to recover against social hosts).
320. See Sparlin, supra note 1, at 623-24. Justice McMorrow claimed that the major-
ity's decision "forsakes victims of drunk driving." Charles II, 651 N.E.2d at 172
(McMorrow, J., dissenting).
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of their intoxicated guests. 32' As a result, social hosts do not have the
"deep pockets" for which most plaintiffs are searching. 322 Therefore,
although some cases may significantly limit a plaintiff's potential com-
pensation, most cases will involve social hosts that are as judgment
proof as any drunk driver.323
Others have suggested that the Charles II decision will permit the
drunk driving tragedy to continue.324 Justice McMorrow argued that
without civil liability, adults can serve alcohol to minors with im-
3251 nfatpunity. In fact, Illinois law offers significant criminal penalties
against those that serve alcohol to minors.326 Moreover, few statistics
are available to make a competent prediction on this decision's effect
on the drunk driving problem in Illinois.3 27 In the aftermath of the
Coulter decision, in which the California Supreme Court established a
remedy against social hosts, alcohol related fatalities increased by over
twenty percent. 328 Upon the legislature's abrogation of the Coulter
321. Charles !i, 651 N.E.2d at 172-73 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
322. Sparlin, supra note 1, at 623-24.
323. Id.
324. See Charles I. 651 N.E.2d at 171-72 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (claiming that
the General Assembly's efforts to curb drunk driving, while commendable, have not
been completely sufficient).
325. Id. at 172 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow states: "Under the
majority's holding, adults are free to serve alcohol to minors until the youths are intoxi-
cated, and nevertheless permit the minors to then drive a vehicle in spite of their inebri-
ation." Id. at 172-73 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
326. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 235, § 5/6-16 (West 1992). The relevant portion
of the statute reads:
(a) No person, after purchasing or otherwise obtaining alcoholic liquor, shall
sell, give or deliver such alcoholic liquor to another person under the age of 21
years, except in the performance of a religious ceremony or service. Any
person who violates the provisions of this paragraph of this subsection (a) is
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and the person's sentence shall include, but
shall not be limited to, a fine of not less than $500.
(c) Any person shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor where he or she
knowingly permits a gathering at a residence which he or she occupies of two
or more persons where any one or more of the persons is under 21 years of age
and the following factors also apply:
(1) the person occupying the residence knows that any such person under the
age of 21 is in possession of or is consuming any alcoholic beverage; and
(2) the possession or consumption of the alcohol by the person under 21 is
not otherwise permitted by this Act; and
(3) the person occupying the residence knows that the person under the age
of 21 leaves the residence in an intoxicated condition.
Id.
327. See Sparlin, supra note 1, at 616-17.
328. Id. at 616-18.
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decision, however, alcohol related fatalities went down. 32 9 At a mini-
mum, then, it is not known whether the lack of social host liability is
likely to affect drunk driving fatalities in Illinois.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although many courts throughout the nation impose liability upon
social hosts whose guests cause injury, Illinois courts traditionally did
not impose such liability.330 Starting in 1991, however, appellate
courts in Illinois created a district split by imposing social host liabil-
ity.33" ' In 1995, the Supreme Court of Illinois resolved this district
split in Charles v. Seigfried.332 The supreme court correctly held that
the Dramshop Act preempts all alcohol related liability. Furthermore,
the supreme court correctly determined that, if the traditional Illinois
rule against social host liability is to be changed, the General Assembly
must be the branch of government to act. 333 Although this decision re-
spected the separation of powers preserved under the Illinois Constitu-
tion, the supreme court did not relinquish its ability to change the
common law or recognize a civil remedy based on the violation of a
statute.334 Social host liability implicates a number of complicated le-
gal questions, and the court properly reasoned that the General As-
sembly is most able to formulate a law in this complicated area.335
Finally, although the legislature will acquiesce in the Charles I deci-
sion, the decision will not permit social hosts to serve alcohol to
minors with impunity.336 In fact, serving alcohol to minors continues
to be a crime, plaintiffs will still be able to recover for drunk driving
related injuries, and little evidence exists to suggest that drunk driving
fatalities will increase in Illinois.337
CARY R. LATIMER
329. Id.
330. See supra part II.A-B.
331. See supra part II.E.
332. See supra part III.B.
333. See supra part IV.
334. See supra part IV.
335. See supra part V.
336. See supra part IV.
337. See supra part V.
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